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INTRODUCTION

Chinese merchandise has been the subject of most
international trade disputes, all over the world, for several years. All
of China's principal trading partners, including the United States,
Japan, and the European Union, treat China as a non-market
economy' (NME), applying special methodologies for determining
whether Chinese enterprises are exporting merchandise at less than
fair value. However, until 2006 the recognition of China as an NME
meant that unfair trade allegations were based on pricing theories for
antidumping, never government programs or actions unfairly
subsidizing exported merchandise. The general rule was that
government subsidies are countervailable only when they distort
markets, and NMEs have no markets to distort.
The United States began launching simultaneous antidumping
duty (AD) and countervailing duty (CVD) investigations of Chinese
merchandise after the November 2006 congressional elections. This
change in practice inevitably triggered legal disputes that
collectivized under the banner of GPX, an American importer of offthe-road tires (OTR Tires) from China.
The U.S. Court of
International Trade (CIT) and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit (CAFC) were asked to decide whether CVD
investigations into merchandise from NMEs were in accordance with
law and, if they were, whether they could be conducted
simultaneously with antidumping investigations. The United States
Congress, unhappy with the decisions of the appellate court, swiftiy
rewrote the law. The constitutionality of the revised statute then was
challenged in the same courts.
I.

BACKGROUND: SUBSIDIES, TRADE LAW, AND NON-MARKET
ECONOMIES

A.

Why GPX?

This Article is about a single line of cases (identified collectively as
GPX) that arose from investigations at the U.S. Department of
Commerce (Commerce), were appealed to the CIT, and on to the
CAFC. Decisions of those courts led to an act of Congress that was
introduced and passed in record time, despite congressional paralysis
on virtually all other issues, only to have the new law brought before
1. A non-market economy (NME) is deñned as "any foreign country that. . .
does not operate on market principles of cost or pricing structures, so that sales of
merchandise in such country do not reflect the fair value of the merchandise." 19
U.S.C. §1677(18) (A) (2006).
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the same courts on complaints that it is not constitutional. The CIT
recently found the new law constitutional, but that decision, at the
time of this writing, is not yet final and could be appealed to the
CAFC. While United States courts grapple with the new law, the
People's Republic of China (PRC) has taken the matter before the
World Trade Organization (WTO), requesting an application of
international law to the actions in the United States.
.The GPX cases arise from CVD and AD petitions filed
simultaneously in 2006 against OTR Tires from the PRC. The United
States treats the PRC as an NME, which means that the United States
analyzes allegations of unfair trade in the PRC differently from the
way in which it treats almost every other country in the world.^ The
PRC wants to be treated by the United States as a market economy,
and in 2016 the United States will be required to accord it that
treatment pursuant to the protocol on the PRC's accession to the
WTO in 2001.^
The analysis that the United States currendy applies to the PRC as
an NME increases the likelihood of finding dumping when
investigating allegadons of unfair trade, and tends to increase the
amount of alleged dumping (the "margins") when dumping is found
at all.* However, until 2006, the PRC was exempt from CVD
investigations because, as Commerce periodically indicated, what
makes a government subsidy countervailable is its market-distordng
effects.^ Without a market, subsidies cannot distort.
2. The United States also treats the Republic of Vietnam as an NME. See OFFICE
OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, Vietnam's Accession to the World Trade Organization
(WrO) 2 (2006), available at http://www.usvtc.org/trade/wto/USTRFactSheetWTOBilateral06.pdf. The United States does not trade with Cuba or North Korea,
but presumably would treat Cuba and North Korea as NMEs if there were any trade.
3. See Protocol m the Accessionf of the People's
p
pRepublic
f of Chirm,
p pt. 1.15, WT/L/432
2 3 2001),
2 0 0 1 ) atiaiioife
i i i f e aihttp://unpanl.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents
h / / l / i d / / b l i / d
(Nov. 23,
,/APC[TY/UNPAN002123.pdf (setting the automatic expiration ofthe provision that
currently allows an NME value calculation fifteen years following China's accession to
the WTO).
4. Normal value (NV) represents the fair price of the imported good. It is
calculated differently in NMEs and market economies. See Aaron Ansel, Note, Market
Orientalism: Reassessing an Outdated Anti-Dumping Policy Towards The People's Republic of
China. 35 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 883, 891-92 & n.59 (2010) (explaining how the NME
valuation process disfavors an exporter like the PRC because of the higher dumping
margins, noting that the average China-wide normal value rate was thirteen times
greater than the average market economy rates over the same timeframe).
5. See, e.g, Countervailing Duties, 63 Fed. Reg. 65,348, 65,360 (Nov. 25, 1998)
(noting the practice at the time was to not apply CVD law to NMEs); iee also Ansel,
supra note 4, at 900 (discussing the pre-2006 practice of not imposing CVD duties on
NMEs because subsidies are immeasurable in a government-controlled market). Not
all subsidies are countervailable, as the duties are designed to offset their value to the
exported merchandise. In addition to non-countervailable "green box" subsidies
designated by the WTO (such as for R&D), subsidies are not countervailable unless
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The GPX cases are about application of CVD law to the PRC.^ They
are also about simultaneous dumping and subsidy investigations of
imports from the PRC and consequent measurement problems.^ In
these cases, the PRC itself attempted to intervene, which it had
previously elected not to do,^ reserving its legal actions entirely for
the international body of the WTO rather than United States courts.^
The Application of Countervailing Duty Provisions to Nonmarket
Economy Countries Act,"* fashioned to overturn judicial decisions of
the CIT and CAFC, precipitated a constitutional contest over
legislation given retroactive efFect and resulted in a new Chinese
complaint at the WTO."

they are specific to an enterprise or industry, or a group of enterprises or industries.
For example, governments may pay for roads; when roads are in general use, the cost
for their construction and maintenance is not a countervailable subsidy. See Pub. L.
No. 112-99, 126 Stat. 265 (2012) (to be codified at 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671.1677f-l).
6. A helpful background of the GPX cases can be found in Gregory Spak et al.,
2011 International Trade Law Decisions of the Federal Circuit, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 1105
(2011). Briefly stated, in GPX International Tire Corp. v. United States {CPX V), 666
F.3d 732 (Fed. Cir. 2011), superseded by statute. Pub. L. No. 112-99, 126 Stat. 265
(2012), 05 recognized in GPX Int'l Tire Corp. v. United States, 678 F.3d 1308, 1311
(Fed. Cir. 2012), the Federal Circuit held üiat U.S. law prohibits the application of
GVDstoNMEs. W. at 1125.
7. SieGPX Int'l Tire Corp. v. United States {GPXII), 645 F. Supp. 2d 1231, 1240
(Ct. Int'l Trade 2009) (determining that the use of both countervailing and
antidumping laws was unreasonable because it results in an overlap in punishment
for a single trade violaüon), affd, 666 F.3d 732 (Fed. Cir. 2011), reh'g, 678 F.3d 1308
(Fed. Cir. 2012); see also Garrett E. Lynam, Note, Using WTO Countervailing Duty Law
to Combat Illegally Subsidized Chinese Enterprises in a Nonmarket-Economy: Deciphering tfie
Writing on the Wall, 42 CASE W. RES.J. INT'L L. 739, 7 4 7 ^ 8 (2010) (explaining that the
simultaneous imposition of antidumping and countervailing penalties creates the
potential for "double counting" of the trade remedies).
8. See Motion to Intervene by the Government of the People's Republic of
China at 1, GPXII, 645 F. Supp. 2d 1231 (No. 08-00285), ECF No. 155. The PRC's
motion was later denied for failing to demonstrate good cause. GPX Int'l Tire Corp.
V. United States, No. 08^0285, 2009 WL 362136, at *1 (Ct. Int'l Trade Feb. 12, 2009).
9. A critical exception was its intervention in the case of Coated Free Sheet Paper.
See Gov't of the People's Republic of China v. United States {Coated Free Sheet Paper),
483 F. Supp. 2d 1274 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2007). Here, the PRC intervened to file a
motion for a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction to halt the
investigation, which ultimately was dismissed by the CIT. See id. at 1275 (dismissing
the PRC's request for a preliminary injunction because the court determined it did
not have jurisdiction to near the PRC's claims). This intervention had an enduring
impact on the GPX cases that are the subject of this Article.
10. Pub. L. No. 112-99, 126 Stat. 265 (2012) (to be codified at 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671,
1677f-l).
11. Request for Consultations by China, United States—Countervailing and AntiDumping Measures on Certain Products from China, WT/DS449/1 (Sept. 20, 2012)
[hereinafter China WTO Request for Consultations] (requesting consultations with
the United States regarding Public Law 112-99). "
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Trade Remedy Law

The trade remedy laws of the United States, such as the AD and
CVD laws, are based on four ideas:
(1) that goods whose production or export is subsidized by a
foreign government are not fairly traded when entering the United
States and may be subject to "countervailing duties" that would offset
the value of the subsidies. Offsetting duties then would force the
goods to compete "on a level playing field" against American-made
goods whose production has been achieved without government
subsidy;^^
(2) that goods imported into the United States and sold at a price
lower than the price at home, or their cost of production, are
"dumped" and may be subject to "antidumping duties" that would
offset the "margin" of dumping, which is determined by adding to
the "dumped price" the difference between the marketed price and
the home price or the cost of production (plus an allowance for
profit);'^
(3) that goods whose importation into the United States suddenly
surges, displacing competing American goods because of their sheer
and sudden volume, should be subject to a "safeguard," a limitation
on quantity determined through a quota or tariff or tariff-rate
quota;''' and
(4) that goods that infringe on U.S. intellectual property rights
should not be imported for sale at any price.'^
This Article concerns only the first two types of trade remedies:
CVDs and ADs. United States trade analysis is bifurcated between
Commerce, which determines whether there is dumping and
whether there are countervailable subsidies,^^ and the U.S.

12. Georgetown Steel Corp. v. United States, 801 F.2d 1308, 1315 (Fed. Cir.
1986) (explaining that the purpose of CVD law is "to offset the unfair competitive
advantage that foreign producers would otherwise enjoy from export subsidies paid
by their governments" (quoting Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 437 U.S. 443,
456 (1978))).
13. JOSEPHE. PATTISON, ANTIDUMPING&Cou^4TERVAIUNGDl^YLAWS § 1:2 (2012),
available at Westlaw ANTIDUMP (explaining that AD laws are intended to restrict the
unfair practice of price discrimination in different national markets by imposing a
duty that offsets the advantages othenvise gained through price discrimination). Not
every WTO member includes profit in its antidumping calculations.
14. See 19 U.S.C. § 2251 (a) (2006) (permitting the President to take action if the
article being imported into the U.S. at increased quantities injures or threatens to
injure the domestic industry).
15. See id. § 1337(a)(l)(B) (defining an unlawful trade practice to include
importing a good that infringes on a U.S. patent or copyright).
16. 19 U.S.C. § 1671 (a) (designating Commerce as the "administering authority,"
which provides the responsibility of determining whether to impose a CVD); id. § 1673(1)
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International Trade Commission (ITC), which determines whether a
domestic industry is materially injured by unfairly traded imports, or
threatened with material injury by reason of imminent quantities of
unfairly traded imports.'' When Commerce reaches an affirmative
determination, fmding dumping or subsidies, it goes on to measure
by how much, proposing "margins" to be implemented as tariffs that
are expected to "level the playing field," offsetting the amount of
dumping or subsidies so that the goods are effectively fairly traded
when entering the United States.^^ However, only when the ITC
affirmatively finds injury or threat of injury are tariffs imposed.'^ This
Article concerns only Commerce's determinations in the GPX cases.
The central issue presented by the parties in the case on appeal,
GPX International Tire Corp. v. United Stated

{GPX V), was the

application of the principles governing both CVD and AD laws
together when merchandise is imported from an NME.^* The CIT
elected to combine the AD and CVD records in these cases, which the
United States and the petitioning parties challenged as beyond the
scope ofthe court's authority. ^^
Although CVD and AD appeals normally are heard separately, this
case presented a unique question: whether a country designated an
NME for AD purposes could be subject to a subsidies investigation.23
There had never been a methodology for examining subsidies in an
NME^** Rather, it was generally understood that all unfair trade
(delegating to Commerce the responsibility to determine whether merchandise will
be sold in the United States at less than fair value).
17. /d. §1673(2).
18. See Ansel, supra note 4, at 886-87 (tracing the procedural steps taken by
Commerce in an AD investigation); see also Robert H. Lantz, The Search for Consistency:
TreatTnent of Nonmarket Economies in Transition Under United States Antidumping and
Counteruailing Duty Laws, 10 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 993, 1001 (1995) (explaining
how Commerce "fixes" the dumping margin in an AD investigation).
19. See Lanu, supra note 18, at 1001-02 (describing the role the ITC plays in
determining injury).
20. GPX V, 666 F.3d 732 (Fed. Cir. 2011). reh'g, 678 F.3d 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2012),
remanded to20\S WL 64465 (Ct. Int'l Trade Jan. 7, 2013).
21. See id. at 734 (summarizing the issue as whether both CVDs and ADs apply to
a nonmarket country).
22. See GPX Int'l Tire Corp. v. United States {GPXI), 587 F. Supp. 2d 1278, 1283
(Ct. Int'l Trade 2008) (rejecting Commerce's position that the court could not
impose injunctive remedies with respect to the AD and CVD investigations).
23. See CPX II, 645 F. Supp. 2d 1231, 1234-35 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2009)
(summarizing the court's conclusions with respect to the applicability of AD
methodology in a CVD investigation, the primary issue in GPX), affd, 666 F.3d 732
(Fed. Cir. 2011), reh'g, 678 F.3d 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2012), remanded to 2013 WL 64465
(Ct. Int'l Trade Jan. 7, 2013).
24. See Lauren W. Clarke, Note, The Market-Oriented Enterprise Approach: The Best
Response to the Questionable United States Trade Practices Scrutinized in CPX International
Tire Corp. v. United States, 60 CATH. U. L. REV. 809, 815 (2011) (noting that

2013]

TESTING THE LIMITS OF TRADE LAW RATIONALITY

793

arising from an NME was addressed by the special NME methodology
in AD cases.^^
The parties and the CIT in GPX focused on issues raised by the
simultaneous AD and CVD investigations into imports of the same
merchandise from NMEs.^« The central principle of the CAFC's 1986
landmark decision in Georgetown Steel Corp. v. United States'^ had

prohibited CVD investigations into merchandise from NMEs
regardless of whether there was an AD investigation into the same
merchandise at the same time.^® The parties in GPX had accepted
that this decision had been overturned.^^
On appeal, the CAFC did not accept the interpretations of
Georgetown Steel as adopted by Chief Judge Jane Restani of the CIT in
GPX IL^ The CAFC did not accept the U.S. Government's argument
that the court in Georgetown Steel vfas merely deferring to Commerce's
authoritative interpretation of the law on a case-by-case basis, a

Commerce determined that CVDs were inapplicable to NMEs, and thus there could
be no methodology to calculate any duties).
25. See GPX II, 645 F. Supp. 2d at 1239 ("Commerce's past interpretation of the
statutes had only been along clear lines—either a country was an NME country and
CVDs were not imposed, or it was an ME country and CVDs could be imposed.");
Clarke, supra note 24, at 812 (stating that for twenty years, the sole remedy levied
against an NME for an unfair trading practice were in the form of ADs).
26. See, e.g., GPX II, 645 F. Supp. 2d at 1240 (explaining how the court must
determine the reasonableness of Commerce's joint application of AD and CVD law).
27. 801F.2dl308(Fed. Cir. 1986).
28. See Georgetown Steel, 801 F.2d at 1314 (concluding that Congress did not
intend to apply CVD law to NME's because of the structural nature of the economy
in an NME).
29. The rationale in the change from Georgetovm Steel vras Commerce's
determination that the PRC economy had undergone sufficient economic reforms
that it was now possible to track a specific financial benefit conveyed by the Chinese
government to a producer. See, e.g., id. at 1237 (chronicling Commerce's revision in
policy from not applying CVD law to NMEs, which was premised on Georgetovm Steel,
to applying CVD law subsequendy to the PRC, after 2006); Memorandum from
Shauna Lee-Alaia and Lawrence Norton, Office of Policy, Import Admin., to David
M. Spooner, Assistant Sec'y for Import Admin. 2 (Mar. 29, 2007) [hereinafter
Georgetown Steel Memorandum], available at http://ia.ita.doc.KOv/download/prccfsp/CFS%20China.Georgetown%20applicability.pdf
(concluding
that
the
Georgetown Steel decision Moes not bar the application of CVD law to imports from
China"); see also GPX II, 645 F. Supp. 2d at 1237 (characterizing Georgetown Steel zs
limited to its facts).
30. See GPX V, 666 F.3d 732, 734 (Fed. Cir. 2011) ("The Trade Court held that
Commerce's 2007 interpretation of countervailing duty law as permitting the
imposition of such duties was 'unreasonable' because of the high likeUhood of
'double counting' when both countervailing duties and antidumping duties are
assessed against goods from NME countries. We afiirm, but on a different ground:
. . . government payments cannot be characterized as 'subsidies' in a non-market
economy context, and thus . .. countervailing duty law does not apply to NME
countries." (citations omitted)), superseded by statute. Pub. L. No. 112-99, 126 Stat. 265
(2012), as recognized in GPX Int'l Tire Corp. v. United States, 678 F.3d 1308, 1311
(Fed. Cir. 2012).
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decision that would have been defined by the facts and not the
By interpreting the Georgetown Steel decision as one dependent on
facts, Commerce could claim that the facts pertaining to China in
2006 were sufficiendy difiFerent from the facts pertaining to "Soviet
style" or "Stalinist" economies in 1986 so as to authorize Commerce
to treat them differendy.^^ The CAFC, however, asserted that its 1986
decision was based on the law, and therefore was not to be
overturned by a change in facts.^^
The CAFC disagreed with the CIT when it returned to the first
principle—whether it was legal for Commerce to investigate subsidies
in an NME.^'* After congressional intervention, however, the issues
on which the CIT had focused in GPX—whether simultaneous CVD
and AD investigations into the same merchandise from an NME were
legal and, if they were, how they were to be conducted^^—again
became relevant on remand to the CIT, due to the way in which the
constitutional challenges to the new law were framed.^^
The parties also challenged Commerce's CVD and AD
determinations with respect to other issues, mosdy involving
"routine" international trade disputes over how to measure unfair
trade effects.^^ The CIT easily disposed of the other AD issues
31. See id. at 744 {rejecting Commerce's contention that Georsetoum 5tó¿/applied
only when "it is impossible to identify subsidies within the NME" (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
32. See Georgetown Stóe/Memorandum, supra note 29, at 4 (noting that the present
PRC economy does not lack the presence of market forces).
33. See GPX V, 666 F.3d at 738-39 (affirming Georgetown Steets applicability to
current law).
34. See id. at 745 (finding that the legislative amendments adopted by Congress
prevented the application of CVD law to NME countries); Spak etal., Jí¿^a note 6, at
1126 (reiterating the court's conclusion that Congress "legislatively ratified" the
inapplicability of CVD laws to NME countries).
35. See, e.g., GPX JI, 645 F. Supp. 2d 1231, 1234 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2009), ajfd, 666
F.3d 732 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (stating me court's conclusion that Commerce can impose
simultaneous CVD and AD duties but requiring it to develop additional
methodologies to do so), reh'g, 678 F.3d 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2012), remanded to 2013 WL
64465 (Ct. Int'l Trade Jan. 7, 2013).
36. See GPX Int'l Tire Corp. v. United States {GPX VII), No. 08-00285, 2013 WL
64465, at *14 (Ct. Int'l Trade Jan. 7, 2013) (concluding that the new law retroactively
providing for CVDs to apply to an NME, while only prospectively providing for the
double counting problem, is constitutional).
37. Following remand to Commerce, the court upheld Commerce's following
determinations: (1) Hebei Starbright Tire Co., Ltd. (Starbright) did not warrant
"market oriented enterprise" status, CPX International Trade Corp. v. United States
{GPX III), 715 F. Supp. 2d 1337, 1347 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2010); (2) Commerce's
decision not to allow an offset in the AD calculations for indirect selling expenses
despite using similar adjustments in the calculation of Starbright's export prices, id.
at 1348-49; (3) Commerce's failure to exclude unrefunded value added taxes from
its calculation ofthe respondents' normal value, id. at 1350-51; (4) the exclusion of
certain overhead items from the factors of production used in the normal value
calculations, id. at 1351; and (5) the decision not to use "zeroing" in its AD
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without delaying the case,^^ and the remaining CVD issues became
moot as a result of the CIT's 2010 decision to require Commerce to
revoke the CVD order.^^ Now that the law. has revived the CVD case.
Judge Restani, after finding the new law constitutional, addressed the
remaining CVD issues, finding that the plaintiffs waived one issue,
upholding Commerce on another, and remanding the three
remaining CVD issues to Commerce for a new determination due on
AprU 16, 2013.*°
C. NME Subsidy Allegations and China

The central issue, as interpreted by the CIT and as recreated by
Congress following the CAFC's decision, is whether Commerce can
entertain CVD and AD petitions together when the subject
merchandise is exported from an NME. This issue, like the one
Congress intervened to "fix," may be largely moot by 2016 when the
WTO Accession Protocol for China mandates recognition of China as
a market economy."" However, NME status will still apply to Vietnam,
and likely to Cuba and North Korea, should the embargo of Cuba be
calculations due to its change in policy on zeroing in original investigations following
adverse WTO rulings, id. at 1353^54. See also id. at 1342 n.l (describing these issues
as "fine-tuning adjustments" to the AD methodology).
38. The court did, however, grant Commerce a voluntary remand to explain
better its reasoning with respect to whether Commerce should use surrogate value
information from India on steel wire or steel rod. Id. at 1349-50.
39. 5ee id. at 1344 n.4 (explaining that it was unnecessary to discuss other CVD
calculation issues because the court determined CVD remedies could not be
imposed).
40. Judge Restani found that tbe plaintiffs waived their challenge to Commerce's
cut-off date before which it would not include any alleged subsidies in its calculation
of a respondent's CVD rate. GPX VII, 2013 WL 64465, at *15. Commerce went back
to 2001, whereas the plaintiffs had argued Commerce could not go back before 2006.
Id. at *4. Judge Restani upheld Commerce's decision to assign to the respondent
only part of tbe value of debt forgiveness to a tbird party tbat the respondent and
other companies had guaranteed. Id. at *23. She remanded to Commerce to reweigh the evidence that Commerce used to determine that old subsidies had not
been extinguisbed when Starbright was privatized. Id. at *23-24. She agreed with
Commerce s privatization methodology, but found Commerce had failed to consider
properly all of the evidence in applying tbat methodology. Id. at *24. She also found
Commerce was unreasonable in claiming it could not find benchmarks to use in
determining to what extent the privatization purchase price offset prior subsidies,
when it could create a surrogate benchmark for all other subsidies. Id. at *22.
Finally, she remanded for Commerce to explain better its inflation rate adjustment
for its surrogate bencbmark for valuing loans. Id. at *23-24. On February 21, 2013
Judge Restani granted an extension for Commerce to file the remand determination
from March 8, 2013 to April 16, 2013 with briefing on that remand determination
taking place in late May 2013. GPX Int'l Tire Corp. v. United States, No 08-00285
(Ct. Int'l Trade Feb 21, 2013).
41. See Protocol on the Accession of the People's Republic of Ghina, supra note 3, at pt.
1.15 (d) (providing that the PRC will be recognized as a market economy fifteen years
following accession into the WTO).
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lifted or commercially significant imports from North Korea occur.**^
These decisions, and the new law, thus will remain relevant as they
apply to those countries.
China has sought recognition as a market economy for several
years.''^ For international trade purposes, some eighty countries have
recognized China as a market economy, but not the United States,
Canada, Japan, the European Union, or Australia, which are China's
most important trade partners."*^ U.S. trade law provides for
recognition of "market-oriented" enterprises or industries (or
sectors), but Commerce has never identified anything "marketoriented" in China."*^
There are two broad consequences of treatment as an NME. First,
because it is assumed that prices within an NME do not reflect market
principles,**^ the AD calculation cannot be based on a company's
home market prices or its home market costs.**^ Instead, Commerce

42. Exec. Order No. 13,570. 3 C.F.R. 233 (2012) (prohibiting transactions with North
Korea); Exec. Order No. 13.466, 3 C.F.R. 195 (2009) (same); Exec. Order No. 13.551, 3
C.F.R. 242 (2011) (same); Ctiban Assets CmtrolRegulations, 31 C.F.R. pt 515 (2012).
43. For example, in a speech before the World Economic Forum. Chinese
Premier Wen Jiabao called upon European leaders to "recognize China's full market
economy status" prior to the 2016 WTO deadline. Wen Says W&rld Must Get 'Houses in
Order,' Not Rely on China, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Sept. 14, 2011 5:52 AM).
http://www.bloombere.com/news/2011-09-14/china-s-wen-says-world-must-cut-debtana-deficits-increase-joDS.html.
44. No one. including the Chinese Government, maintains a list. One estimate
of "[m] ore than 80" was reported by Fujing & Ding Qingfen, Experts: EU Statement
Opens Door to Status, CHINA DAILY (Feb. 16, 2012 7:57 AM),
http://europe.chinadaily.com.cn/europe/2012-02/16/content_l 4622790.htm; see
also Lynam, supra note 7, at 749 Se n.5O (citing to an article that claimed ninety-seven
countries recognized the PRC as a market economy).
45. In 1992, the last time Commerce entertained CVD allegations against China
before 2006, it concluded in a negative final determination "that the PRC fans
industry is not a [market-oriented industry]. As a result, we determine that the CVD
law cannot be applied to the PRC fan industry." Oscillating and Ceiling Fans from
the People's Republic of China, 57 Fed. Reg. 24,018, 24.019 (Dep't of Commerce
June 5. 1992) (final negative CVD determination). In OPXIII, Commerce has said it
has no methodology to determine whether a sector or an enterprise in China is
market-oriented. See CPX II, 645 F. Supp. 2d 1231, 1243 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2009)
(explaining Commerce's position for declining GPX's request for market-oriented
enterprise treatment because it had "no policies, procedures or standards for
evaluating the MOE status of a company at this time"). Notwithstanding these
conclusions. Commerce reasoned that the Chinese economy itself was sufficiently
market-based to permit subsidies investigations. See id. at 1237 (noting Commerce's
determination that the PRC had implemented sufficient economic reforms that it
could now identify a subsidy).
46. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677(18) (A) (2006) (defining "nonmarket economy country"
to mean any foreign country that does not operate on market principles of cost or
pricing structure, such that the "sales of merchandise in such country do not reflect
the fair value of the merchandise").
47. Id. § 1677b(c) (stating that when the subject merchandise is exportedfi-oma
NME country, the administering authority relies on the "value of the factors of
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requires the company to report the quantities of each item used in
making the subject merchandise (including labor, materials, and
energy), and it uses that information to calculate a cost of production
by multiplying the quantities of each reported "factor of production"
by "surrogate values" for those factors obtained from market
economies.*® Second, because actionable subsidies must be marketdistorting, the Georgetown Steel doctrine effectively barred CVD cases
for merchandise from NMEs*^ (the term "nonmarket economy" is
defined in the statute to mean a country that "does not operate on
market principles;"^" consequently, when a country is an NME, there
is no market to distort).
Commerce decided in 2006 that it could investigate alleged
subsidies in China after all, without treating China as a market
economy and vwthout having ever recognized any industry or sector
of the Chinese economy as "market oriented."^' A 2006 internal
Memorandum written for the Lined Paper antidumping investigation
set out the premises for this conclusion by finding the Chinese
economy "evolving" away from central control.^^ The mid-term
production utilized in producing the merchandise" to generate a "normal value,"
rather than the price at which the product is sold in the exporting country).
48. Id.; see also Sanghan Wang, U.S. Trade Laws Concerning Nonmarket Economies
Revisited far Eaimess and Consistency, 10 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 593, 616 (1996)
(describing the fair value determination using the two-step factors of production
methodology).
49. Georgetown Steel Corp. v. United States, 801 F.2d 1308,1315 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
50. 19 u s e §1677(18) (A).
51. Commerce had found in 1992 that the fan industry in China was not "market
oriented." Oscillating and Ceiling Fatis from the People's Republic of China, 57 Fed.
Reg. 24,018, 24,019 (Dep't of Commerce June 5, 1992) (final negative CVD
determination). In its final decision memorandum in Coated Eree Sheet Paper,
Commerce conceded that it could not even consider whether an enterprise could
qualify for such consideration: "The Department has not yet determinect whether it
would be appropriate to introduce a market oriented enterprise process, nor has it
determinect what elements should he considered in any such test." Memorandum
from Stephen J. Claeys, Deputy Assistant Sec'y for Imp. Admin., to David M.
Spooner, Assistant Sec'y for Imp. Admin. 9 (Oct. 17, 2007), available at
http://ia.ita.doc.gov/frn/summary/PRC/E7-21041-I.pdf.
After rejecting the
contention that Starbright was operating in a market economy. Commerce
denied consideration of Starbright as a "market oriented enterprise" on the
grounds that its request for such consideration was untimely, notwithstanding
that Commerce still had not developed any method for making such a
determination. CPX II, 645 F. Supp. 2d 1231, 1244 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2009)
(disagreeing with Commerce's denial of Starbright's request as untimely, stating
that Commerce "cannot now rely on any claim of untimeliness because that was
not its avowed reason for the rejection of the request").
52. Memorandum from Shauna Lee-Alaia et al.. Office of Policy, Imp. Admin., to
David M. Spooner, Assistant Sec'y for Imp. Admin. 1-4 (Aug. 30, 2006), available at
http://ia.ita.doc.gov/download/prc-nme-status/prc-lined-paper-memo-08302006.pdf
(concluding that China's economy had evolved and was no longer Stalinist in its
central control, hut not open enough to permit market economy methodology in AD
investigations).
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election of a Democratic Congress pressing to penalize China as a
currency manipulator likely encouraged the subsequent conclusion
that subsidy allegations could be investigated while still treating
China as an NME.^^
Addressing a motion from the PRC for injunctive relief and a
restraining order to halt the Commerce CVD investigation in Coated
Free Sheet Paper from the People's Republic ofChina,^'^ the CIT opined tha
Georgetown Steel did not bar CVD investigations of NMEs.^^ Counsel
for the PRC introduced the NME question on a procedural motion,^^
notwithstanding recent precedent that the CIT does not look
favorably upon a motion to stop an investigation due to expense and
inconvenience.^^ The high standards for equitable relief required a
probability of success on the merits and, in this instance, the PRC
needed a finding that the Commerce initiation was ultra vires.^^ Even
though Judge Carman dismissed the motion on jurisdictional
grounds, he commented: "[w]hile a later court may determine that
the statute favors Plaintiffs' interpretation that CVD law does not
apply to NMEs, it is not clear at this point that Commerce's initiation
of the CVD investigation was 'patently ultra vires.'"^^ On appeal to the
CAEC, Commerce insisted that the CVD statute, by referring
generally to countries and making no exception for NMEs, required
Commerce to apply the CVD statute to China.^
Commerce made its right to proceed simultaneously in AD and
CVD investigations of an NME its secondary argument, even though
it was the only live issue for appeal.^' Commerce's first argument
then required the respondent parties to argue that the statute not
53. Nonetheless, Commerce persistendy resisted treating currency exchange
itself as a countervailable subsidy and refused to investigate allegations about it. Both
Presidents Bush and Obama denied the currency manipulation label, and
Commerce's policy remained aligned with the Presidents. Annie Lowry, A Tightrope
on China's Currency, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 22, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/23
/us/politics/romney-pledge-to-call<hina-a-currency-manipulator-poses-risks-expertssay.html?_r=O.
54. Gov't of the People's Republic of China v. United States {Coated Free Sheet
Paper), 483 F. Supp. 2d 1274 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2007).
55. /á. at 1275, 1282.
56. M a t 1277-78.
57. Abitibi-Consol. Inc. v. United States, 437 F. Supp. 2d 1352, 1360-62 (Ct. Int'l
Trade 2006).
58. Coated Free Sheet Paper, 483 F. Supp. 2d at 1278, 1282-83.
59. /rf. at 1282.
60. CPX V, 666 F.3d 732, 737-38 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (arguing that "the plain
statutory language mandat[es] that a countervailing duty shall be imposed . . . even
in an NME country" (internal quotation marks omitted)), superseded by statute, Pub. L.
No. 112-99, 126 Stat. 265 (2012), as recognized in. GPX Int'l Tire Corp. v. United
States, 678 F.3d 1308,1311 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
61. /rf. at744.
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only did not mandate application of the CVD law to NMEs, but that
the CAFC had forbidden doing so in Georgetown Steel.^^ Commerce,
thus, was challenging the CAFC to accept its argument that the CAFC
in Georgetown Steel had merely endorsed its interpretation of the
statute based on facts and not on law.^^
In rejecting Commerce's argument, the CAFC effectively
overturned Judge Carman and Judge Restani, who had accepted the
CVD investigation itself but not its simultaneous pursuit with the AD
investigation. The fact that the motion before Judge Carman was
brought by the PRC, and was so captioned, was particularly
important. Hence, the PRC put at risk the issue of whether it was
susceptible, as an NME, to CVD investigations, on a procedural
motion it stood litde, if any chance, of winning. Only because
Commerce elected to reopen the issue was the PRC able to obtain an
appellate court review of NME susceptibility to CVD investigations.
On March 29, 2007, Commerce completed a second internal
memorandum, in which it concluded that Georgetown Steel referred to
Commerce's discretionary assessment of foreign economies, not to a
statutory bar." Suddenly, trade remedy petitions against Chinese
merchandise routinely contained subsidy allegations, and Commerce
was investigating simultaneously AD and CVD allegations in a halfdozen cases.^^
The PRC limited its participation in these cases to Commerce,
where it was obliged to answer questionnaires about government
programs and practices, without having to make any appearances at
the ITC.^^ But the PRC had already gone to court once in Coated Free
62. Id. at 738.
65. Id. at 739.
64. Georgetown Steel Memorandum, supra note 29, at 2, 4 (concluding that the
analytical elements of the Georgetown Steel opinion were framed "according to the
traditional, Soviet-style economies of the 1980s," and that the "Department's policy
that gave rise to the Georgetown Steel litigation is inapposite to the current
investigation and does not bar application of the CVD law to imports from China").
65. See, e.g.. Lightweight Thermal Paper from the People's Republic of China,
72 Fed. Reg. 62,209 (Dep't of Commerce Nov. 2, 2007) (initiation); Raw Flexible
Magnets from the People's Republic of China, 72 Fed. Reg. 59,076 (Dep't of
Commerce Oct. 18, 2007) (initiation); Certain New Pneumatic Off-the-Road Tires
from the People's Republic of Ghina, 72 Fed. Reg. 44,122 (Aug. 7, 2007)
(initiation); Laminated Woven Sacks from the People's Republic of China, 72 Fed.
Reg. 40,839 (Dep't of Gommerce July 25, 2007) (initiation); Light-Walled
Rectangular Pipe and Tube from the People's Republic of Ghina, 72 Fed. Reg.
40,281 (Dep't of Gommerce July 24, 2007) (initiation); Gircular Welded Garbon
Quality Steel Pipe from the People's Republic of Ghina, 72 Fed. Reg. 36,668 (Dep't
of Gommerce July 5, 2007) (initiation).
66. Compare Certain New Pneumatic Off-the-Road Tires from the People's
Republic of Ghina, 73 Fed. Reg. 40,480, 40,481 n.2 (Dep't of Gommerce July 15,
2008) (final affirmative GVD determination) (listing the PRG as a respondent), with
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Sheet Paper with disastrous results—the CIT rejected the PRC's motion
and decided that neither Georgetown Steel nor any Commerce practices
or policies necessarily impeded investigating alleged Chinese
subsidies while treating China as an NME.^^
Once Commerce found both dumping and subsidies in all of the
new cases, and the ITC found injury in all of them, the Chinese
Government opted to appeal them together to the WTO.^ It did not
join in any appeals to the CIT, but the American counsel who had
filed for the PRC in Coated Free Sheet Paper on behalf of the PRC
replaced the American counsel representing CPX and Starbright in
the OTR Tires {GPX) investigation, in the appeal to the CIT.^^
The new GPX (and Starbright) counsel, the same counsel who had
ignored precedent in the risky motion trying to stop the Coated Free
Sheet Paper investigation, now moved the CIT to enjoin the collection
of cash duty deposits at the rates Commerce had determined,
claiming the rates would cause irreparable harm to the Chinese
company.^'' This motion, almost inevitably, was denied,'' and then in
an extraordinary procedural step the new counsel moved the CIT to
reconsider its decision, which also was denied.'^ After the second
denial, the same counsel moved for the intervention of the PRC as a
party to the litigation, on the grounds that the private parties (GPX,
an American company, and Starbright, a Chinese company) could
not afford to continue the litigation following the adverse decisions
on duty deposits.^^ This appearance for the PRC in U.S. court was

OÊf-the-Road Tires from China. Amended Administrative Protective Order Service
List, Inv. Nos. 701-TA-448. 73]-TA-in7 (Ian. 30, 2009) (Final), available
at httD://\v\vw.usitc.gov/secretary/fed_reg_notices/service_lists/documents/701-TA448_POF_.pdf.
67. Gov't of the People's Republic of China v. United States {Coated Free Sheet
Paper), 483 F. Supp. 2d 1274, 1282 & n.ll (Ct. Int'l Trade 2007) (finding that
Commerce has broad discretion to determine whether application of CVX> law to
NMEs is appropriate and, regardless of whether Commerce chooses to apply CVD
law, the PRC is still obligated to participate in the CVD investigation).
68. Request for the Establishment of a Panel by China, United States—Definitive
Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain Products from Ghina, WT/DS379/2

(Dec. 12, 2008).
69. See, e.g., GPXII, 645 F. Supp. 2d 1231, 1234 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2009); CoatedFree
Sheet Paper, 483 F. Supp. 2d at 1274.
70. GPXI, 587 F. Supp. 2d 1278,1282 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2008).
71. Id. at 1287, 1289, 1291-92 (denying CPX's motion for a preliminary
injunction because GPX failed to show a likelihood of success on the merits and
irreparable harm).
72. GPX Int'l Tire Corp. v. United States, 593 F. Supp. 2d 1389, 1390, 1393 (Ct.
Int'l Trade 2008).
i
73. GPX Int'l Tire Corp. v. United States, No.' 08-00285, 2009 WL 362136, at *1
(Ct. Int'l Trade Feb. 12, 2009).
Î
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too late, and the court denied the motion to intervene.^^ Counsel
then continued to represent the private parties.
In the proceedings before Commerce, Counsel for GPX and
Starbright had contested whether Commerce could investigate
subsidy allegations at all.'^ Their contention supported China's
political representations that it should be recognized as a market
economy or, in the alternative, that if not so recognized it could not
be treated as a market economy for purposes of the CVD law but as
an NME under the AD law.™
On appeal, new counsel (the same that had represented the PRC
in Coated Free Sheet Paper) conceded Commerce's authority to
investigate subsidy allegations in an NME and narrowed the contest
to whether AD and CVD investigations could proceed
simultaneously." Commerce had rationalized that China had
74. Id. Appeals were filed and pursued by the private parties on September 9,
2008. Id. After the CIT denied motions for preliminary injunction and a temporary
restraining order on the imposition of cash deposit collections based on Commerce's
combined AD and CVD margins (on November 12, 2008), and denied a motion for
reconsideration (on December 30, 2008), the private Chinese parties moved to
amend their Complaint (on January 5, 2009) yet apparently concluded (or so they
reported to the court) that they could not afford to continue with the judicial
proceedings and the Government of China moved to intervene, effectively replacing
them (on January 13, 2009). Id. Petitioners and the U.S. Government opposed this
late appearance, which China defended as the result of "excusable neglect." Id. at
*2. After Judge Restani denied the motion for intervention, rejecting the claim of
"good cause," counsel continued on behalf of "respondents," "plaintiffs" (on
appeals), and "plaintiffs-respondent," without further naming the Chinese (or
American) parties on their pleadings. Id. at *3. See generally GPX II, 645 F. Supp. 2d
1231, 1231 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2009). Thus, having sworn to the court that they could
not go on, the private parties went on. The counsel who proposed to represent the
Chinese Government continued to represent them. And, to make the relationship
between the private parties and the Chinese Government more conspicuous, the
same counsel suddenly had sufficient resources representing private parties. A
central dispute in the CVD case concerned whether the government continued in
any way to influence the affairs of the privatized company. It could not have helped
the Chinese position, if only by appearance, that Starbright, claiming to be a private
enterprise free of all government involvement or influence, filed an amended
complaint (on January 5), and then had its own counsel seek to represent the
Chinese Government eight days later. Now that the CIT has upheld the
constitutionality of the new law and remanded the privatization issues to Commerce,
counsel and legal bills could become evidence of a relationship between the
government and the private parties.
75. See Memorandum from Stephen J. Claeys, Deputy Assistant Sec'y for Imp. Admin,
to David M. Spooner, Assistant Sec'y for Imp. Admin. 11 (July 7, 2008) [hereinafter OTR
Tire Memorandum], available aihttp://ia.ita.doc.gov/frn/siimmary/PRC/E^16154-I.pdf.
76. GPX/, 645 F. Supp. 2d at 1241-42.
77. See Respondent Plaintiffs' Reply Brief Concerning the CVD/NME AD
Coordination Issue at 1, GPX II, 645 F. Supp. 2d 1231 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2009) (No. 0800285), ECF No. 219 ("Defendant [United States] and Defenclant-Intervenors
[Bridgestone Americas Inc. et al.] continue to misstate the pertinent issue before the
Court, portraying the issue as whether the CVD law can be applied to a nonmarket
economy country, in general, and insisting the plain language of the statute requires
the law's application to any 'country.' Contrary to their claim, however, the
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become enough of a market economy to justify treating it differently
from the NMEs addressed by Georgetown Steel, but not enough to be
treated like other market economies.^^
The solution was to borrow methodology from the AD regime: just
as the cost of inputs were measured for dumping with surrogate
values in market economies,^^ so the value of government subsidies
would be measured with surrogate values. For example, the value of
land or rent would not be determined from rents or land sales in
China; instead, values would be taken from Thailand, and more
specifically from Bangkok.^^ Commerce used as its benchmark, for
the price a Chinese company was paying for land in rural Shandong
Province, the price a private enterprise was paying for a comparably
sized piece of land in Bangkok.^' Commerce paid no attention to the
expert opinion of a western land use economist that such
comparisons were
pertinent issue before the Court is whether Commerce is permitted under the
statutory framework to apply the CVD law to China while simultaneously imposing AD
duties using its NME AD methodology.").
78. Georgetown Steel Memorandum, supra note 29, at 10-11. See CPX II, 645 F.
Supp. 2d at 1237 ("Commerce noted that the PRC's present-day economy 'features
both a certain degree of private initiative as well as significant government
intervention, combining market processes with continued state guidance.' Despite
these findings. Commerce continues to treat the PRC as an NME country due to
remaining government constraints, such as the slow process of liberalizing the
renminbi to allow development of a normal foreign exchange market, the
continuing restrictions on foreign investment, the slow pace of reforms in the
banking sector, and the limitations on private ovmership." (internal citations
omitted)).
79. CPX V, 666 F.3d 732, 734-35 (Fed. Cir. 2011) ("In a 'nonmarket economy
country,' however, local prices cannot be used to calculate the normal value because,
by definition, 'sales of merchandise in such country do not reflect the fair value of
the merchandise.' Instead, Commerce may estimate the normal value based on data
from 'appropriate' market economy countries. Because normal values calculated
from surrogate countries do not reflect domestic subsidies, the result potentially is
that the normal value calculation may be higher than the actual sale price in the
NME country." (internal citations omitted)), superseded by statute. Pub. L. No. 112-99,
126 Stat. 265 (2012), as recognized in GPX Int'l Tire Corp. v. United States, 678 F.3d
1308,1311 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
80. Laminated Woven Sacks from the People's Republic of China, 72 Fed. Reg.
67,893, 67,909 (Dep't of Commerce Dec. 3, 2007) (preliminary affirmative CVD
determination) (stating that the best means for determining land value in China is
by "comparing prices for land-use rights in China with comparable market-based
prices for land purchases in a country at a comparable level of economic
development that is in a reasonably proximate region outside of China," namely
Thailand). The authors were counsel to the PRC for the CVD investigation at
Commerce in this case.
81. Id.
82. Memorandum from Stephen J. Claeys, Deputy Assistant Sec'y for Imp.
Admin, to David M. Spooner, Assistant Sec'y for Imp. Admin. 60-66 (June 16, 2008),
available at http://ia.ita.doc.gov/fm/summary/prc/E8-14256-l.pdf ("[T]he COC
argues that the Department's selection of land values near Bangkok . . . is irrational
as an economic proposition and contrary to .law because it ignores domestic
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PROBLEMS WITH ACTIONABLE SUBSIDIES IN NON-MARKET
ECONOMIES

A.

Identifying and Measuring Subsidies

The trade remedy laws, implemented from international
agreements framed by the WTO, generally assume that goods are
produced all over the world in market economies.*^ Prices are
determined by the cost of production and then by the meetings of
willing sellers and willing buyers.*"* Competition is expected; fair
competition assumes that the market, and only the market, affects
World trading partners have long understood that not all
economies operate on market principles. Some are centrallycontrolled and directed, and as the government of controlled
economies may determine what is manufactured and in what
quantities, it may also determine price, whether setting it directly, or
permitting it to be the result of many different government actions.®^
Government may control warehouse rents, for example, and
manipulate them to reduce the rent of a company, thereby
subsidizing its production by lowering its.costs. It may set the price
for electricity. The enterprise itself may be state-owned, dictating the
price at which its goods may be sold. NMEs, thus, require a different
set of trade rules because the participants in such economies do not
necessarily play by capitalist rules: warehouse rents, for example, may
not be set by a market for housing or real estate; electricity rates may
be set for social purposes without reference to the cost of producing
benchmarks in favor of out-of country benchmarks effectively forbidden by the WTO
and U.S. law. . . . [T]he value of land in Thailand is unique to the land's productive
use in Thailand such as its proximity to suppliers; transportation costs of inputs and
for workers and customers within Thailand; availability and costs of utility services;
and application of local regulations and taxes. As such,. . . none of these market
conditions in Thailand could be the prevailing market conditions in China. . . .
[T]he Department, [nevertheless] considers the price information for land in
Thailand to be the best and most appropriate information on the record of this
investigation.").
83. See Clarke, supra note 24 (discussing that trade remedies, such as CVDs, were
inapplicable to NMEs).
84. 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(a), (e) (2006) (explaining the details of determining
whether merchandise is sold at "less than fair value" and how to determine the
constructed value of imported merchandise").
85. Diane P. Wood, "Unfair" Trade Injury: A Competition-Based Approach, 41 STAN.
L. REV. 1153, 1167 (1989) (demonstrating that the free trade model works only if all
countries operate under a market economy with competitive conditions).
86. See Ansel, supra note 4, at 890-91 & n.53 (listing the statutory factors
Commerce will consider in, determining whether the country is market-oriented,
including the extent of government control over production, allocation of resources,
price, and output decisions).
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and delivering electricity. When the provision of electricity is a
monopoly, there is no private or competitive domestic benchmark to
identify a market price.
The international trade rules authorize distinct analysis and
treatment for NMEs.^^ Because prices of what is bought and sold in
an NME are not determined in market transactions, market economy
analysis cannot reveal whether a good has been fairly traded or is
dumped.^^ In the absence of a market, the market value and cost of
inputs cannot be determined. So, analysts use "surrogate values" for
the identical or nearly identical inputs from a market economy
comparable in its stage of development to the NME, theorizing what
the inputs would have cost in the same country had it been a market
economy.^^ Those surrogate values are used to calculate a
constructed cost to produce the exported good, which is then
compared to the price charged for the exported good to determine
whether that good is dumped.^^
The determination of a subsidy from an NME presents a much
more difficult problem than the calculation for alleged dumping.
The WTO defines an actionable (or, forbidden) "subsidy" as a
government's financial contribution that distorts the market.^' The
87. Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade 1994 art. 4, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakech A^eement Establishing the
World Trade Organization, Annex IA, 1869 U.N.T.S. 145 (providing for
determination of dumping even absent domestic sales).
88. Wang, supra note 48, at 602 (establishing that quantifying dumping and
corresponding subsidies is difficult for nonmarket economies because decisions are
made centrally and no "independent financial condition of the enterprise" can be
determined).
89. See supra note 48 and accompanying text; see also GPX III, 715 F. Supp. 2d
1337,1349 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2010) ("As the court has stated previously. Commerce has
established a practice of calculating surrogate values based on broad information
from public documents."), affd, 666 F.3d 732 (Fed. Cir. 2011); Certain Coated Paper
Suitable for High-Quality Print Graphics Using Sheet-Fed Presses from the People's
Republic of Chma, 75 Fed. Reg. 24,892, 24,897 (Dep't of Commerce May 6, 2010)
(notice) ("Accordingly, the normal value ('NV') of the product is appropriately
based on factors of production ('FOP') valued in a surrogate ME country . . . . ' ) .
90. The selection of surrogate values is always controversial, in part because of
disagreement over the levels of economic development in different countries. The
land use expert in Laminated Woven Sacks believed the comparison of urban land in
Bangkok to rural land in Shandong Province was malapropos. See Michael Goldberg,
Gritical Issues in Valuing Land as Related to Laminated Woven Sacks from the People's

Republic of Ghina, C-570-917 (Jan 10, 2008) (stating that comparison sites must be in
the same urban area, and "functionally and locationally analogous" to prove a fruitful
estimation of property value, but that "[i]n no circumstances can sites be used from
other countries or even other urban areas in the same country"). Commerce has
variously used prices in Bangladesh, Indonesia, India and elsewhere as surrogate
values for China. See supra note 80.
91. Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures art. 1.1 (a) (1), Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakech Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex lA,
1869 U.N.T.S. 229.
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premise, therefore, for a subsidy to be actionable is that it must be
market-distorting. The premise for an NME, however, is that there is
no market to distort.
This principle, that actionable subsidies are not possible in NMEs
because there are no markets to distort, underscores the reasoning of
the CAFC in Georgetown Steel^^ The CAFC, affirming Commerce's
decision, seemed to establish the rule that CVD petitions could not
be filed against NMEs.®^ Commerce did initiate an investigation into
alleged subsidies in China in 1991 in Oscillating Fans, but only to
confirm that if the sector were not "market oriented," a CVD case
could not be pursued.^* That rule applied until 2006,^^ and neither
the courts. Congress, nor Commerce took any steps during that
period to upset the status quo.
B.

The GPX Issue: The Double Remedy as a Commerce Practice

The methodology that Commerce uses to calculate ADs in NME
cases disregards actual selling prices and production costs within the
NME and replaces them with a cost calculation that uses prices from
a third country to value all of the factors of production (e.g., land,
labor, capital, energy and materials) for the product.^® Commerce,
thus, automatically offsets the benefit of any subsidy that the NME
producer might have received on the production of that product.^'
Consequendy, were Commerce to offset those production subsidies
with a CVD order on the same merchandise, it necessarily would be
imposing a double remedy for any such subsidies.^^
92. 801 F.2d 1308, 1310,1315 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
93. Id. at 1313-16 (concluding the economic incentive and benefits the Soviet
Union and the German Democratic Republic granted were neither a "bounty" nor a
"çrant" within the meaning of the Tariff Act of 1930; thus, they did not create the
kind of unfair advantage the CVD laws were intended to remedy; and Congress
specifically addressed NME problems under AD laws, without intending CVD laws to
apply in a similar way).
94. Oscillating Fans and Ceiling Fans from the People's Republic of China, 56
Fed. Reg. 57,616 (Dep't of Commerce Nov. 13, 1991) (initiation).
95. Coated Free Sheet Paper from the People's Republic of China, Indonesia,
and the Republic of Korea, 71 Fed. Reg. 68,546, 68,549 (Dep't of Commerce Nov. 27,
2006) (initiation) (stating that "stifficient argument and subsidy allegations . . . to
meet the statutory criteria for initiating a countervailing duty investigation of CFS
paper from the PRC" were submitted by the petitioner).
96. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(c) (2006) (detailing how "normal value" is calculated:
in determining AD and CVD orders in NME cases).
97. See Dukgeun Ahn & Jieun Lee, Countervailing Duty Against Ghina: Opening a
Pandora's Box in the WTO System?,]. INT'L ECON. L. 329, 353-55 (2011) (detailing how
using a constructed normal value—by using surrogate values—in NME AD
determinations already accounts for the subsidies that CVDs are meant to correct).
98. See U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, G A O - 0 5 - 4 7 4 , U.S.-CHINA TRADE:
COMMERCE FACES PRACTICAL AND LEGAL CHALLENGES IN APPLYING COUNTERVAILING

DUTIES 28 (2005).
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This double remedy is most obvious when Commerce considers
alleged subsidies on the purchase of manufacturing inputs from stateowned enterprises, a common allegation in CVD investigations into
NME merchandise.
NME antidumping methodology already
addressed any subsidies on the cost of inputs, determining that actual
prices for inputs obtained from within an NME could not be used
because they were not market prices, and therefore required
substitution with surrogate values for the same inputs as priced in
market economies.^^ Similarly, when CVD petitions allege that the
Chinese domestic price of the same input as purchased from a stateowned enterprise is subsidized. Commerce calculates the amount of
that subsidy as the difference between the actual domestic price paid
for the input and the surrogate value for that same input purchased
in a third country. "'^ The input for dumping purposes and the
subsidy for CVD purposes were counting the same thing twice, and
because AD and CVD margins are additive, the remedies—offsetting
the price of the inputs and the value of the subsidies—were being
doubled.'^'
Judge Restani agreed with the plaintiffs in the GPX case that
simultaneous AD and CVD investigations in an NME presented a
problem of a double remedy and sent the matter back to Commerce
to fmd a way to solve the double counting problem.'^^ She found that
Commerce had discretion to impose CVDs on Chinese merchandise
while still considering China to be an NME (what counsel for the
Chinese parties agreed before the CIT was no longer the central issue
in dispute, it having been decided in Coated Free Sheet Paper) but, she
said, Commerce had to avoid double counting of subsidies when it
applied the CVD law and the AD NME methodology to the same
products at the same time.'°^
Double counting of subsidies does not occur with Commerce's
market economy AD methodologies because, in those cases, normal
value is calculated based on actual prices in the foreign market and
99. See ii/. at 19-21.
100. See, e.g.. Certain New Pneumatic OfF-the-Road Tires from the People's
Republic of China, 72 Fed. Reg. 71,360, 71,364-65 (Dep't of Commerce Dec. 17,
2007) (preliminary affirmative CVD determination) (calculating a loan subsidy by
reference to an external benchmark because "there is not a functioning market for
loans within the PRC").
101. Respondent Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of
Their Motion for Judgment on the Agency Records at 32, CPX II, 645 F. Supp. 2d
1231 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2009) (No. 08-00285), ECF No. 180-2.
102. CPX II, 645 F. Supp. 2d at 1234-35. Judge Restani's first decision in the CPX
case denied the plaintiffs' motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary
injunction. CPX I, 587 F. Supp. 2d 1278, 1292 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2008).
103. CPX II, 645 F. Supp. 2d at 1240-43.
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actual costs incurred in that same market.'"* Thus, if there were any
subsidies imbedded in those prices or costs, they would not be offset
by the AD methodology and would need to be addressed separately
in a CVD investigation.
Commerce interpreted Judge Restani's GPX///decision as giving it
three options, to: (1) not apply the CVD law; (2) apply the market
economy AD methodology in the GPX case; or (3) lower the cash
deposits imposed in the AD case by the amount of cash deposits
imposed in the CVD case.'"^ Commerce chose the third option, to
lower the AD deposits by the amount ofthe CVD deposits.'""^
In GPX International Tire Gorp. v. United States^^"^ {GPX III), Judge

Restani found that Commerce's preferred option on remand was
contrary to U.S. law because there was no provision in the AD statute
to lower duties by the amount of CVDs, and because that option
would unreasonably require the parties to go through the expense of
CVD proceedings that would be essentially useless.'"^ On August 4,
2010, she ordered Commerce to forgo the imposition of CVDs on
OTR Tires from the PRC,'°^ based on her ruling that U.S. law
prohibited Commerce from imposing duties higher than the amount
needed to offset subsidies on imported products.""
In ordering Commerce to forgo imposing CVDs, Judge Restani
found that Commerce did not have die ability to determine the
degree to which double counting was occurring and therefore could
not offset it direcdy within its NME methodology."' Thus, the CIT
left open the option in future cases for Commerce to try new
methodologies to eliminate the double counting."^ Commerce
continued to have the option of imposing CVDs on products from
China when there would be no companion AD case on the same
products, and in cases in which Commerce might exercise its
discretion to recognize a market oriented industry. Recognition of
104. See generally 19 C.F.R. §§ 351.401-.407 (2012) (specifying how normal value is
calculated in market economies).
105. GPX///, 715F. Supp. 2d 1337, 1344 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2010).
106. Id. (noting that Commerce reasoned that the offset was the "least
confusing option").
107. 715 F. Supp. 2d 1337 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2010).
108. Id. at 1344-46.
109. /d. at 1354-55.
110. The WTO applied the same reasoning in addressing the double counting
issue.
Appellate Body Report, United States—Definitive Anti-Dumping and
Countervailing Duties on Certain Products from China, H 611(d), WT/DS379/AB/R
(Mar. 11, 2011) [hereinafter WTO Appellate Body AD and CVD Ruling].
111. GPX///, 715 F. Supp. 2d at 1346.
112. See id. at 1345-46 (disallowing CVDs in conjunction with ADs if Commerce
has no methodology to solve the high risk of double counting).
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an MOI would not require recognizing China as a market
economy."^
Commerce appealed the CIT's decision to the CAFC.^'^ On
December 19, 2011, the CAFC upheld the CIT's decision to
terminate the CVD investigation and rescind the CVD order, but for
different reasons than those offered by Judge Restani.'^^
C.

The Double Remedy as a Statutory Problem

In its 2011 decision, the CAFC held in GPX V that the U.S. CVD
statute, independent of assessments of Georgetown Steel, prohibits
applying CVDs to NMEs."^ It found "that when amending and
reenacting [die] countervailing duty law in 1988 and 1994, Congress
legislatively ratified earlier consistent administrative and judicial
interpretations that government payments cannot be characterized as
'subsidies' in an NME context, and thus that countervailing duty law
does not apply to NME countries."'^^
In the preceding investigation, the PRC and the affected
companies had argued that the CAFC in Georgetown Steel had barred
CVD investigations in NMEs and that Congress had forgone
subsequent opportunities to overrule the CAFC, thereby assenting to
the CAFC's conclusions."^ Commerce had argued that Georgetown
Steel had merely upheld Commerce's discretion, and that conditions
had changed sufficiently in China to justify subsidy investigations
notwithstanding NME status. *^^ Judge Carman accepted this view
when ruling on the PRC motion for an injunction in Coated Free Sheet
Paper,^^^ and subsequent CIT rulings had reached the same
conclusion, including Judge Restani's in
P

113. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(c)(l) (2006) (allowing normal value in NMEs to be
detennined by the same process as market economies). Despite all of these options
and Commerce's determination to treat China for CVD purposes as more of a
market economy than the Soviet Union, Commerce stilt denies China market
economy recognition, still has no methodology for establishing MOI status for a
sector or MOE status for a particular enterprise, and still has not recognized either a
sector or any enterprise in China as market oriented.
114. CPX V, 666 F.3d 732, 737 (Fed. Cir. 2011), superseded by statute, Pub. L. No.
112-99, 126 Stat. 265 (2012), as recognized in GPX IntT Tire Corp. v. United States.
678 F.3d 1308,1311 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
115. Id. at 737-45 (finding that Congress had legislatively ratified the holding in
Ceorgetown Steel that prohibited CVD investigations against NMEs).
116. /d. at 734.
117. Id.
118. OTR Tire Memorandum, supra note 75, at 28.
119. Id. at 38 (stating the position of Commerce).
120. Coated Free Sheet Paper, 483 F. Supp. 1274, 1282 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2008).
121. GPXII, 645 F. Supp. 2d 1231,1238,1243 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2009).
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Here, in GPX V, the CAFC rejected this interpretation of Georgetown
Steel and ruled broadly that Commerce, as a matter of U.S. law, was
definitively prohibited from applying CVDs to NMEs in all cases, even
in cases without a companion AD investigation where there is no risk
of double counting.'^^ The decision overruled the option Judge
Restani had given Commerce, which was to allow CVDs EIS
companions to ADs if Commerce could sort out a methodology that
solved the double counting problem.*^^ Appealing to the CAFC put
Commerce in a worse position in dealing with China than it had been
at any time since 2006.
The CAFC ruling in GPX V had a much broader impact than the
CIT decision that Commerce had appealed because the CIT would
have permitted CVD investigations and orders in NMEs and only
denied CVD investigations and orders that were simultaneous and on
the same goods as AD orders.'^* The CIT also left open to Commerce
the possibility of solving the double counting problem, which would
have permitted it to maintain simultaneous AD and CVD
investigations.'^^ The CAFC ruling had a much broader impact than
the WTO ruling in China's favor concerning the application of CVDs
in NME cases because the WTO challenge was based exclusively on
the issue of double counting.'^®
In GPX V, the CAFC reviewed the legislative history regarding CVD
application to NMEs and concluded that Congress was well aware that
Commerce and the courts were interpreting the CVD law as being
inapplicable to NMEs when Congress amended the CVD law in 1984,
1988, and again in 1994.'" The CAFC held that congressional
awareness of this interpretation, when it amended the statute,
constitutes legislative ratification ofthat interpretation.'^*
122. GPX l^ 666 F.3d at 734.
123. GPXII, 645 F. Supp. 2d at 1234-35.
124. Compare GPX V, 666 F.3d at 754 (holding that "countervailing duty law does
not apply to NME countries" because "Congress legislatively ratified earlier
consistent administrative and judicial interpretations that government payments
cannot be characterized as 'subsidies' in a non-market economy context"), with GPX
III, 715 F. Supp. 2d 1357, 1341-42 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2010) (holding that "Commerce
must forego the imposition of the [CVD] law on the [NME] products" due to
Commerce's "inability... to determine whether, and to what degree double
counting occurs when NME antiduinping remedies are imposed on the same good"
as CVDs).
125. GPX II, 645 F. Supp. 2d at 1245.
126. VVTO Appellate Body AD and CVD Ruling, supra note 110, 1 611(d)(i-iii)
(concluding that "imposition of anti-dumping duties calculated on the basis of an
NME methodology, concurrendy with the imposition of countervailing duties on the
same products, vnthout having assessed whether double remedies arose from such
concurrent duties" violates the SCM Agreement).
127. GPX V, 666 F.5d at 741-45.
128. M at 734.
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The CAFC reasoned that, in light of legislative ratification of
Commerce's previous determination that the CVD laws do not apply
to NMEs, Commerce was no longer free to change its mind:
Although Commerce has wide discretion in administering
countervailing duty and antidumping law, it cannot exercise this
discretion contrary to congressional intent. We affirm the holding
of the Trade Court that countervailing duties cannot be applied to
goods from NME countries. As we concluded in Georgetown Steel, if
Commerce believes that the law should be changed, the
appropriate approach is to seek legislative change.'^^
Judge Restani's decision bound Commerce only in the specific case
that she decided. Commerce was free to continue to, apply CVDs in
other NME cases because the CIT does not set precedent and its
decisions govern only specific cases (the CIT is the equivalent of a
U.S. district court).'^^ The deference accorded to Judge Carman's
commentary, notwithstanding his own caveat that later judgments
could disagree,'^' was based on perceptions of the decision's
persuasiveness and reinforced by Commerce's analytical
memoranda.'^2 By contrast, the CAFC's decision was precedent that
bound the lower courts and Commerce, not only in the specific case
before the court, but in all future cases unless Congress were to
change the statute.
III. LECISIATION AND NEW LECAL CHALLENGES

A.

Hasty Passage of a Law Permitting CVD Investigations in NMEs

The CAFC's decision altered the judicial and legislative agendas.
Over a period of five years, CIT decisions and Commerce
determinations subjected Chinese exports to the United States to a
dozen CVD cases.'^^ Because of a CIT ruling on a motion for
129. Id. at 745.
130. SeeMgoma. Steel Corp. v. United States, 865 F.2d 240, 243 (Fed. Cir. 1989)
(noting that CIT is a trial court and approving of a CIT judge arriving at a decision
different from another trial court judge).
131. Cov't of the People's Republic of China v. United States {Coated Free Sheet
Paper), 483 F. Supp. 2d 1274, 1282 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2007) ("While a later court may
determine that the statute favors Plaintiffs' interpretation that countervailing dutylaw does not apply to NMEs, it is not clear at this point that Commerce's initiation of
the countervailing duty investigation was 'patently ultra vires."').
132. See; e.g., OTR Tire Memorandum, supra note 75, at 37-42 (arguing that
Georgetown 5tóe/recognized Commerce's broad discretion in applying CVDs to NMEs
and did not hold that Commerce could never apply CVDs against NMEs).
133. See, e.g., Bridgestone Ams., Inc. v. United States, 636 F. Supp. 2d 1347, 135657 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2009) (determining that China was an NME and calculating price
based on a surrogate ME countiy); Certain New Pneumatic Off-the-Road Tires from
the People's Republic of China, 73 Fed. Reg. 40,480, 40,480-83 (Dep't of Commerce
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injunctive relief in 2007,'^'' whether Commerce could investigate
subsidy allegations against merchandise from NMEs was no longer
being adjudicated; rather, the questions that came before the CAFC
involved double counting and double remedies.'^^ Prior to the GPX
case reaching the CAFC, all parties assumed (or accepted) that China
could not reasonably argue that, as an NME, it was not susceptible to
CVDs.^^^ The legal disputes instead revolved around calculating
methodologies and technicalities. The CAFC ended these disputes,
which only Congress could revive.
The CAFC decision in December 2011 started a clock because
without a successful request for rehearing en bane or a successful writ
of certiorari to the Supreme Court—both improbable—all of the
pending and prior CVD determinations against Chinese merchandise
would be stopped or reversed. Only Congress could prevent a
chaotic turnabout.
Congress reveled in the opportunity to overturn the judiciary with
legislation punishing China. The House of Representatives Ways and
Means Committee referred corrective legislation to the full House on
the same day it had been introduced to the Committee, February 29,
2012.^" Less than a week later, on March 6, 2012, the Committee's
Chair moved to suspend the rules in order to expedite passage of the
(July 15, 2008) (final affirmative CVD determination) (determining that coimtervailable
subsidies are provided to Chinese exporters oftiresand imposing rates).
134. See Goated Free Sheet Paper, 483 F. Supp. 2d at 1283-84 (rejecting the PRC's
argument that Commerce is not authorized to apply CVD law to products from
NMEs and thus should be enjoined from continuing its CVD investigation and ruling
instead that the Court lacked jurisdiction).
135. See GPX V, 666 F.3d 732, 734 (Fed. Cir. 2011); GPXII, 645 F. Supp. 2d 1231,
1240-41 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2009) (determining that the dual imposition of ADs and
CVDs in NME countries has a high potential for double remedies).
136 See Corrected Brief of Defendant-Appellant United States at 8-9, 18-27, GPX
V, 666 F.3d 732 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (Nos. 2011-1107, 2011-1108, 2011-1109), 2011 WL
860398, at *8-9, *18-27 (proposing that not only does tiie plain language of the
Tariff Act of 1930 demonstrate that Commerce shall impose CVDs on any countryincluding an NME—but further noting that GPX did not contest the issue when
Commerce published the CVD order).
137. See Hearing on President Obama's Trade Policy Agenda with U.S. Trade
Representative Ron Kirk and Second Panel on the Future of U.S. Trade Negotiations: Hearing
Before the H Gomm. on Ways (¡f Means, 112th Cong. 2 (2012) (statement of Rep. Dave
Camp, Chairman, H. Comm. on Ways & Means) [hereinafter Trade Policy Hearing^
("Ranking Member Levin, Chairman Brady, Ranking Member McDermott and I are
introducing targeted legislation today to make sure that we have the tools we need to
address unfair Chinese subsidies through our countervailing duty law in a WTO
consistent manner."). See generally Elliot J. Feldman, Nothing Unites the United States
Gongress Like China (And Not in a Good Way): Treating China Like Canada (Maybe Even
Worse), CHINA-US TRADE L., (Mar. 20, 2012), http://www.chinaustradelawblog.com
/2012/03/articles/cvd/nothing-unites-the-united-states-congress-like-china-and-notin-a-good-way-treating-china-like-canada-maybe-even-worse (recounting the history of
the bill's passage).
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^ All on that same day, the House suspended the rules, debated
the bill, proceeded through various rule technicalities and passed the
bill itself by a margin of 370 to 39.'^^ On March 7, 2012, the very next
day, it went to the Senate, which read the bill twice, considered it,
read it a third time, and passed it without amendment by unanimous
consent.'*** It was sent to the White House one day later, and was
signed by the President on March 13, 2012.*141
B. Dealing with Double Counting

Until the CAFC's decision, the subject at the CIT and before
Commerce was double counting, not whether Commerce could
investigate subsidy allegations in NMEs.*^^ When Congress rushed to
preserve the collection of affirmative CVD determinations otherwise
overturned by the CAFC, it concentrated on overturning Georgetown
Steel and GPX V, not on double counting.'^^
House Ways and Means Committee Chairman Dave Camp (RMichigan) articulated Republican reservations about the bill,
specifically that it was not curing the double counting problem that
had been the focus of Judge Restani's remands to Commerce.'^ The
bill, therefore, contains a second section, "Adjustment of
Antidumping Duty in Certain Proceedings Relating to Imports from
Nonmarket Economy Countries.'"'*^ Chairman Camp was concerned
that the legislation could violate WTO obligations enunciated in a
March 2011 Appellate Body decision warning against double

138. Id.; see also 158 CONG. REC. Hn66 (daily ed. Mar. 6, 2012) (statement of Rep.
Dave Camp).
139. 158 CONG. REC. H1178 (daily ed. Mar. 6, 2012).
140. See 158 CONG. REC. S1441 (daily ed. Mar. 7, 2012).
141. Application of Countervailing Duty Provisions to Nonmarket Economy
Countries, Pub. L. No. 112-99. 126 Stat 265 (2012) (to be codified at 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671,
1677f-l);RemarksonTrade, 2012 Daily Comp. Près. Doc. 1,2 (Mar. 13,2012).
142. See Spak et al., supra note 6, at 1126 (discussing that CIT and Commerce
determinations focused on double counting until the case reached the CAFC, at
which time the court rendered a judgment on "a different and much broader
ground").
143. SeeGFX Int'l Tire Corp. v. United States (GPX V7), 678 F.3d 1308, 1311 (Fed.
Cir. 2012) (noting that it is clear that Congress sought to overrule CPX l^considering
both the language of the new legislation and the lengthy discussion of the case
during the floor debate); see also 158 CONG. REC. H1167 (daily ed. Mar. 6, 2012)
(statement of Rep. Dave Camp) (stating that the bill overturns an erroneous decision
by the Federal Circuit); 158 CONG. REG. HI 170-72 (daily ed. Mar. 6, 2012)
(statementof Rep. Jackson Lee) (discussing at length Ce&rgetown Steel and CPXV).
144. See Trade Policy Hearing, supra note 137, at 2 (statement of Rep. Dave Camp,
Chairman, H. Comm. on Ways 8c Means) (stating the importance of the new
legislation comporting with the WTO).
145. Application of Countervailing Duty Provisions to Nonmarket Economy
Countries sec. 2, § 777A(f).
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counting.^*® President Obama, supporting the legislation, insisted it
must not violate WTO obligations, but only Chairman Camp acted,
albeit unsuccessfully, to meet this requirement.
The CIT had ordered Commerce to figure out a solution to the
double counting problem before finding subsidies.'*' The new
legislation orders Commerce to find subsidies and then figure out a
solution.'*^ Commerce applied the new law in its section 129
determinations,'*^ purportedly bringing OTR Tires and several other
cases into conformity with adverse WTO rulings on the double
counting issue.'^° In those cases it made a small downward
adjustment to the antidumping rates for the amount it calculated was
being double counted in the CVD rates.'^' Judge Restani already
found this solution contrary to law, so the jury is still out as to
whether Commerce's attempted solution to the double counting
problem—repeating an old one—^will find approval at the CAFC.
Even if Commerce were unsuccessful in solving the double
counting problem, it still would have to impose CVD duties, based on
the new law. Companies in NMEs will be required to contest the
illegal double counting on a case-by-case basis,'^^ yet without the
Camp intervention the legislation may not have addressed double
counting at all.
The new law. Application of Countervailing Duty Provisions to
Nonmarket Economy Countries, Public Law Number 112-99 (Pub. L.
112-99), provides that "the merchandise on which countervailing
duties shall be imposed . . . includes a class or kind of merchandise
imported, or sold (or likely to be sold) for importation, into the

146. See Trade Policy Hearing, supra note 137, at 2 (statement of Rep. Dave Camp,
Chairman, H. Comm. on Ways & Means) (stressing the importance of'"address [ing]
unfair Chinese subsidies through our countervailing duty law in a WTO consistent
manner").
147. GPX //, 645 F. Supp. 2d 1231, 1243 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2009) ("If there is a
substantial potential for double counting, and it is too difficult for Commerce to
determine whether, and to what degree double counting is occurring. Commerce
should refrain from imposing CVDs on NME goods until it is prepared to address
this problem through improved methodologies or new statutory tools."), aff'd, 715 F.
Supp. 2d 1337,1345 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2010).
148. Pub. L. No. 112-99 sec. 2(a), § 777A(f).
149. Section 129 of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act, 19 U.S.C. § 3538 (2006),
provides the statutory process for bringing agency determinations ruled inconsistent
with the U.S. government's WTO obligations into conformity.
150. Memorandum from Christian Marsh, Deputy Assistant Secy'f for
Antidumping & Countervailing Duty Operations, to Paul Piquado, Assistant Sec'y for
Imp. Admin. 16 (fuly 31, 2012), ot/oîfaéfe oí http://ia.ita.doc.gov/download/sectionl29
/prc-o tr-tires-Final-129-Detennination-20120830.pdf.
151. M a t 16.
152. Pub. L. No. 112-99 sec. 2(a), § 777A(f).
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United States from a nonmarket economy country."'^^ It provides in a
separate section that Commerce shall "reduce the antidumping duty by
the amount of the increase in the weighted average dumping margin
estimated by the administering authority [i.e., Commerce] . . . ."'^•*
This reduction depends, however, upon Commerce's ability to
"reasonably estimate the extent to which the countervailable
subsidy... in combination with the use of normal value [from the
antidumping calculation] has increased the weighted average
dumping margin for the class or kind of merchandise."'^^ When
Commerce cannot make that estimate, it cannot make the
adjustment, but by statute it must still assess CVDs.'^^ The first
provision, that CVDs should be applied to merchandise from NMEs,
was made retroactive to November 20, 2006;'^' however, the second
provision, to avoid double counting, applies only to new cases
initiated on or after March 13,
^
C. Back in Court

While Congress was busy passing Public Law 112-99, the GPX case
remained pending at the CAFC as a result of the U.S. Covernment's
filing of a petition for rehearing en banc.'^^ Congress beat the
judicial deadline, but consequendy left the judicial proceeding
apparently open. Following congressional enactment of this bill, the
CAFC requested the parties to submit further briefing on the impact
of the new legislation on fiature proceedings in the GPX case.'^^ The
intention of the legislation, after all, was to setde the legal dispute.'^'
153. /rf.se
( ) § ( ) ( )
154. /d.sec. 2{a),§777A(f)(l){C).
155. Id.
156. /d.secs. l(a),2(a).
157. Msec. l(b)(l).
158. /d.sec. 2(b)(l).
159. Corrected Petition for Rehearing En Bane of Defendant-Appellant United
States, GPX Int'l Tire Corp. v. United States, GPX W, 678 F.3d 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2012)
(Nos. 2011-1107, 2011-1108, 2011-1109), 2012 WL 1029323).
160. For a more complete discussion of the CAFC's response to the new
legislation, see John J. Burke, The American Government Still Has Three Branches: The
Gourt of Appeals Tells Congress It May Have Acted in Haste, CHINA-U.S. TRADE L. (June 9,
2012),
nttp://\vww.chinaustradelawblog.com/2012/06/articles/cvd/the-ameHcangovemment-süll-has-three-branches-the<ourt-of-appeals-tells<ongress-it-may-haveacted-in-haste.
161. See supra note 144 and accompanying text (discussing the statute's purpose to
correct the improperly decided GPX V); see also 158 CONG. REC. 1171-72 (daily ed.
Mar. 6, 2012) (statement of Rep. Jackson Lee) ("H.R. 4105[] overturns the decision
of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and preserves the validity of the
countervailing duty proceedings against imports from China and Vietnam, beginning
in 2006. . . . The problems raised by [GPX V\ has [sic] been addressed by this
legislation.").
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GPX argued in its brief that Public Law 112-99 is unconstitutional
for two reasons. First, the retroactive effect of the first section would
change the outcome of the GPX V case after the CAFC already had
rendered its decision in favor of GPX in December 2011, based on
the law as it was when GPX had been investigated.'^^ Second, the new
law would create improperly a special rule applicable only to GPX and
to a few other cases in which Commerce may impose both CVDs and
ADs on the same merchandise from an NME without attempting to
avoid double counting.'^^
GPX argued that the different treatment it and a few other
companies, whose cases were initiated between the two effective
dates, would receive as compared to companies for which
investigations would be initiated after March 13, 2012, violated the
Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution because GPX and
those other companies would be treated differently for no reason.'®"*
Companies subject to investigation prior to the legislation would be
exposed to double remedies; companies investigated elfter the
legislation would not be, although only in theory because of the fiaw
in the new statute's language that still leaves to Commerce discretion
on methodology without discretion as to imposing CVDs.'^^
The CAFC quickly rejected the first argument, that the CAFC
decision was already a decided case before Congress changed the law,
because the CAFC had not yet issued its mandate in the GPX case
when Congress enacted Public Law 112-99 and, therefore. Congress
did not change the outcome of a decided court case.'®® The CAFC
appeared more sympathetic to the second argument, however,
because it sent the case back to the CIT on May 9, 2012 with
instructions to the lower court to make "a determination of the
constitutionality of the new legislation and for other appropriate
proceedings."'®^ Congress had not succeeded in ending the legal
controversy.
The GPX case is now back at the CIT, which on January 7, 2013 in
GPX VIP^^ upheld the constitutionality of the new law.'®^ Once the
162. GPX VI, 678 F.3d 1308,1312 (Fed. Gir. 2012).
163. Id.
164. Infra note 171 and accompanying text (contending that the discriminatory
effect violates Equal Protection).
165. GPX VI, 678 F.3d at 1312; see also supra notes 157-59 and accompanying text
(discussing the different dates in the legislation and the possibility for confusion).
166. GPX W, 678 F.3d at 1312.
167. Id. at 1313 ("The second issue, however, is a matter of first impression as to
which we have received only cursory briefmg. . . . [T]his issue should be considered
by the Trade Court in the first instance.").
168. No. 08-00285, 2013 WL 64465 (Ct. Int'l Trade Jan. 7, 2013).
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remands to address CVD calculation issues are completed, GPX and
Starbright can be expected to appeal that decision back to the CAFC.
Even if the CAFC were to overturn the CIT and find that the new law
is unconstitutional, that decision would apply only to the GPX case
and the few other cases in which Commerce applied both CVDs and
ADs to the same merchandise from NMEs because of the limited
application of the decision to investigations between November 20,
2006 and March 13,
D.

The Pending Gonstitutional Issues

CPX and Starbright filed briefs at the CIT on August 17, 2012,
arguing that Public Law 112-99 violates the Equal Protection Clause
because the law treats companies differendy, depending upon when
petitions were filed against them.''' They also argued that the law is
unconstitutional because it is ex post facto, in that the retroactivity
provision applies penalties for alleged offenses before the law
permitted such penalties.'^^
A second Chinese company, Tianjin United Tire & Rubber
International Co. (TUTRIC), which had participated at Commerce
but had not previously filed in the appeals, submitted a separate brief
making essentially the same argument'^^ A third Chinese company,
Beijing Tianhai Industry Co., also made this argument in its
complaint filed on August 20, 2012, challenging Commerce's final
affirmative determinations in the AD and CVD investigations of High
Pressure Steel Cylinders from China}'^'^

Tianhai challenged

the

constitutionality of Public Law 112-99 in the AD case as well as in the
CVD case because Public Law 112-99 calls for Commerce to make

169. See id. at *1, *6-7, *12-14 (assuming arguendo that the new law effected a
retroactive change in the law and then holding that the new law did not rise to the
level of retroactive penal legislation within the scope of the Ex Post Facto Clause and
rejecting plaintifTs due process and equal protection arguments).
170. See CPX VI, 678 F.3d at 1312 (noting the potential validity of appellees'
argument that the new law "improperly creates a special rule applicable only to this
case (or perhaps a few others) due to the different effective dates in the two
provisions').
171. Respondent Plaintiffs' Supplemental Memorandum of Points and Authorities
in Support of Their Motion for Judgment on the Agency Records at 28-29, CPX VII,
No. 08-00285, ECF No. 366-1.
172. M a t 9-13.
173. Brief on Constitutional Issues of Co-Plaintiff Tianjin United Tire and Rubber
International Co. at 8-14, CPX VII, No. 08-00285, ECF No. 367-1 (proposing that
there is no legitimate government purpose for the discriminatory classification).
174. Complaint, Beijing Tianhai Industry Co. v. United States, No. 12-00203 (Ct.
Int'l Trade filed Aug. 20, 2012), ECF No. 9.
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adjustments for double counting in the companion AD case, rather
than in the GVD case.'"
All four companies—GPX, Starbright, TUTRIG, and Tianhai—
argued that the new law violates the Ex Post Facto, Due Process, and
Equal Protection Glauses of the U.S. Gonstitution because the
provision applying the GVD law to NMEs was made retroactive to
2006, whereas the provision requiring Gommerce to try to avoid
double counting when ADs and GVDs are imposed on the same
merchandise applies prospectively only."®
The law, thus,
discriminates against companies subject to cases initiated before
March 13, 2012, exposing them to both ADs and GVDs without any
provision to avoid double counting.'" By contrast, Gommerce must
at least make an attempt to avoid double counting in czises filed after
March 13, 2012.'™
The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) filed its response brief in
the GPX case on October 16, 2012. DOJ's primary argument was that
the difference in effective dates of the two provisions of Public Law
112-99 is constitutional because the provision applying the GVD law
to NMEs, effective November 20, 2006, is not a retroactive change in
the law.'™ Instead, DOJ argued, it is merely a "clarification"
correcting the CAFG's "erroneous" interpretation of prior law.'^° By
contrast, DOJ argued that the provision requiring Gommerce to
attempt to solve the double counting problem is a change from prior
law to accommodate an adverse WTO finding, which requires only
prospective effect.'®'
Because, according to DOJ, there is no
retroactive change in the law, there is no ex post facto change that
could violate the constitutional prohibition on ex post facto
penalties.'^^ Similarly, because the only change in the law is the
175. Id. at 4-5.
176. See supra notes 169-75 and accompanying text (describing the parties'
opposition to the legislation).
177. See supra notes 162-66 and accompanying text (discussing the argument that
Pub. L. No. 112-99 is unconstitutional on equal protection grounds due to the
different effective dates in the two provisions).
178. Application of Countervailing Duty Provisions to Nonmarket Economy
Countries, Pub. L. No. 112-99, sec. 2, § 777A(f), 126 Stat. 265, 265-66 (2012) (calling
for a reduction in the AD by the amount of the increase in the weighted average
dumping margin estimated by the administering authority to offset subsidies in
actions after March 13, 2012).
179. Defendant's Response to Plaintiffs' Supplemental Briefs Regarding^ the
Constitutionality of the New Legislation at 4, CPX VII, No. 08-00285 (Ct. Int'l Trade
Jan. 7, 2013), ECF No. 374 [hereinafter Defendant's Response].
180. Id. at 3-5, 7. The argument is odd, among other reasons, because it asserts
that the CAFC had been advancing an erroneous interpretation of its own ruling.
181. Id. at 8-9. Congressman Camp had insisted on this provision in the law
because of concern about compliance with the WTO.
182. M at 9.
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double counting provision, and that provision applies to all cases
going forward, there is no disparate treatment that could violate the
Equal Protection Clause.'^^
The DOJ arguments would require the CIT, and ultimately the
CAFC, to agree that the new statutory provision requiring Commerce
to apply CVD law to NMEs makes no change to existing law. Yet, the
CAFC in GPX V interpreted the pre-existing law as prohibiting the
application of the CVD law to NMEs and, under the constitutional
separation of powers, the courts, not the legislature, interpret
existing law.'^**
DOJ attempted to side-step the separation of powers problem by
arguing that, because Congress passed and the President signed
Public Law 112-99 before the CAFC's decision in GPX V could
become final, GPX Vwas not a binding judicial decision.'^^ According
to this argument, there was no binding judicial decision that the law
on applying CVDs to NMEs was any different than the law as
"clarified" by Congress in Public Law 112-99.'^'^ Of course, if DOJ
were correct, the CAFC decision would not have been "erroneous,"
because effectively there would have been no decision.
DOJ argued, in the alternative, that even if the first provision of
Public Law 112-99 were retroactive, it would not violate the Equal
Protection Clause because Congress had a rational basis for the
distinction in the effective dates of the two provisions.'^' DOJ
advanced the argument that making the first provision retroactive to
2006 merely reestablished the status quo prior to the CAFC's
misinterpretation of congressional intent and, thus, was rational.'^
Congress's decision not to apply the second provision retroactively
also was rational, according to DOJ, because it would be a significant
burden on Commerce and undermine the interests of administrative
finality and efficiency were Commerce required to redo more than
five years of administrative proceedings in order to apply the double
counting provision retroactively.'^^
183. M a t 11.
184. CPX V, 666 F.3d 732, 734 (Fed. Cir. 2011), superseded by statute. Pub. L. No.
112-99, 126 Stat. 265 (2012), as recognized in GPX IntM Tire Corp. v. United States,
678 F.3d 1308, 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
185. Defendant's Response, supra note 179, at 10.
186. W. at3.
187. M at 17.
188. Id.
189. Id. The CIT has ruled repeatedly that it is not too burdensome on
respondent parties to participate in a full investigation and post cash deposits on
prospective duties before resolving whether there was anything legal about the
investigation in the first instance. Here, DOJ contended that it would be too
burdensome on the very same administrative agency requiring respondent
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Plaintiffs replied to the DOJ arguments on November 6, 2012.'^°
They started by refuting DOJ's argument that the provision of Public
Law 112-99 applying the CVD law to NMEs was a mere clarification of
existing law and, therefore, not retroactive.'^' Plaintiffs pointed out
that the provision could be a clarification only if the pre-existing law
were ambiguous.'^^ Because the CAFC in GPX V did not apply
Chevron deference to Commerce's post-2006 interpretation of the
CVD law,'^^ which it would have been required to do had it found the
statute to be ambiguous, the CAFC found that the pre-existing law
was clear on its face and, consequently. Public Law 122-99 could not
be a mere clarification of pre-existing law.'®*
Plaintiffs refuted DOJ's argument that GPX V has no validity by
noting that the CAFC had denied DOJ's request to vacate it.'^^ Were
the decision invalid, having not achieved finality prior to the
legislative "clarification," it would not have required vacation:
The CAFC understood that the new CVD legislation was a
fundamental change, and not a mere clarification. Therefore,
because the CAFC's December 2011 decision addressed only the
prior law, there was no need to vacate that decision. As an
interpretation of prior CVD law, that CAFC December 2011 decision
still
'^^

participation for it to correct findings in prior cases, even though that agency is
.required to make such changes every time the same CYT remands cases on appeal.
190. Respondent Plaintiffs' Reply to Response Briefs of Defendant and DefendantIntervenors Concerning Constitutional Issues, GPX VII, No. 08-00285 (Ct. Int'l Trade
Jan. 7, 2013), ECF No. 375 [hereinafter Plaintiffs Reply].
191. M at 2.
192. Id.
193. In Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837
(1984), the Supreme Court explained that:
When a court reviews an agency's construction of the statute which it
administers, it is confronted with two questions. First, always, is the question
whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If the
intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well
as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of
Congress. If, however, the court determines Congress has not directly
addressed the precise question at issue, the court does not simply impose its
own construction on the statute, as would be necessary in the absence of an
administrative interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous
with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the
agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.
Id. at 842-43 (footnotes omitted).
194. Plaintiffs Reply, supra note 190, at 3. They also pointed out that the new law
will be codified as a new section to the U.S. Code, 19 U.S.C. § 1671 (f), rather than a
clarification added to an old section, 19 U.S.C. § 1671 (a). Plaintiffs Reply, supra
note 190, at 4.
195. Plaintiffs Reply, supra note 190, at 3 n.2.
196. Id. at 15.
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Plaintiffs also argued that the retroactive change in the law is
unconstitutional as an ex post facto penalty, rather than a
proportional remedy:
A new law cannot be remedial if it is sanctioning conduct—and
imposing an additional remedy—that has already been remedied.
The premise of several decades of trade policy toward NMEs,
repeatedly confirmed by the courts, has been that the special NME
AD rules remedy this problem . . . . Whether the fix is on the CVD
side or the AD does not matter. Under the retroactive application
of the new law, there is no fix at all. Rather, the remedies are
duplicative, punishing the same "problem" of imports from an
NME country twice.'^'
Additionally, plaintifFs argued that the retroactive change in the
law violates due process because it is a retroactive tax with harsh and
oppressive effects, distinguishing the cases cited in DOJ's brief on
due process:
The new statute thus did not restore the statiis quo ante. . . but
rather imposed an interpretation of the statute that even
Commerce did not advance until 2007. Congress is entitled to
change a law if it no longer agrees with it; but where that change
enacts a new tax, it must make the change prospective only.'^^
Finally, plaintiffs argued that Public Law 112-99 violates the Equal
Protection Clause because there is no rational basis for treating
importers whose goods were subject to a CVD investigation prior to
the passage of the new law more harshly than importers whose goods
were subject to such an investigation after the passage of the new
law.'^ A legal change could have that effect, but the law, they
contended, cannot direct it. They refuted DOJ's claims that the
distinction has a rational basis (treating both groups equally would
create "administrative costs" on Commerce and "defeat the purpose"
of the new law) by noting that: (1) forgoing CVDs in cases filed
before the passage of the new law would not impose any
administrative burden on Commerce; and (2) it would not defeat the
purpose of the new law, which was designed, in significant part, to
solve the double counting problem when CVDs are applied to the
same merchandise to which Commerce is applying its NME AD
methodology.^''*'
DOJ and plaintiffs analyzed "equal protection" in Public Law 11299 differently because they focused on different provisions of the new
197.
198.
199.
200.

/rf. at7-8.
/d. atl2.
M at 13.
M a t 14.
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' For purposes of administrative burden, DOJ assumed that the
only way to equalize the treatment of the two groups would be to
apply the double counting provision retroactively to the older
investigations, which would create a significant administrative
burden.^"^ Plaintiffs pointed out that the problem could be solved
without administrative burden by making both provisions
prospective.^"^ When discussing the purpose of the law, DOJ focused
on the purpose of the first provision, which is to assure the
application of the CVD laws to NMEs,^"^ while plaintiffs focused on
the purpose of the second provision, which is to fix the double
counting problem when applying the CVD laws to NMEs.^"^
Chief Judge Restani issued her decision on these constitutional
challenges to Public Law 112-99 in her GPX VII decision, dated
January 7, 2013.^"^ She took several pages to debunk the DOJ's
argument that Section 1 of the new law merely clarified pre-existing
law and, therefore, was not a retroactive change in the law. However,
she did not make a finding on whether that provision is retroactive;
instead, she assumed it was for reasons of judicial economy.^"' She
then found it did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause of the
Constitution because GPX failed to meet its burden to show that
Section 1 of Public Law 112-99 was punitive, rather than remedial,
and remedial laws may be retroactive without violating the ex post
facto prohibition.^"^
Judge Restani found that Public Law 112-99 did not violate due
process.^"^ Because the new law is economic legislation, she applied
the "rationally based on legitimate government interests" test for
determining due process.^'" She concluded that GPX failed to meet
its burden to show that Congress did not have a rational basis for
passing the new legislation or that GPX had a vested interest in not
having the CVD law applied to its imports.^"
Judge Restani found that making Section 1 of Public Law 112-99
retroactive was rationally based on legitimate government interests in
201. CoOT/)are Defendant's Response, supra note 179, at 11 (addressing section 2 of
Public Law 112-99), with Plaintiffs Reply, supra note 190, at 12-13 (focusing on
section 1 of Public Law 112-99).
202. See Defendant's Response, supra note 179, at 13.
203. Plaintiffs Reply, supra note 190, at 12.
204. Defendant's Response, supra note 179, at 15.
205. Plaintiffs Reply, supra note 190, at 14.
206. GPX VII, No. 08-00285, 2013 WL 64465 (Ct. Int'l Trade Jan. 7, 2013).
207. M at*6.
208. /á. at*6-7.
209. /d. at*8-12.
210. Id. 2it*8.
211. M at*ll-12.
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finality in the prior cases, and in not imposing an administrative
burden on Commerce.^'^ ?he also observed that GPX had notice
from Commerce's preliminary determination that its imports from
that day forward could be subject to CVDs and, thus, GPX had no
vested interest in the CAFC's interpretation of prior law.^'^
Judge Restani similarly dismissed GPX's arguments that Public Law
112-99 violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution. She
found the legislation did not target a suspect class or implicate a
fundamental right and, therefore, the difference in treatment
between companies subject to CVD investigations initiated before
and after March 13, 2012 would be upheld as "long as it bears a
rational relation to some legitimate end."^"'* She found that it was
rational for Section 2 of the law to be prospective because its purpose
was to remedy a WTO problem, and such fixes normally are done
only prospectively.^'^ Judge Restani found that Section l's retroactive
application was rationally related to a legitimate end of finality in the
older cases and to avoid imposing an administrative burden on
Commerce.^'^
IV. WHAT IS COMING NEXT, AND WHAT REMAINS

The GPX case is likely to remain pending before the CIT during
the Spring of 2013 while the parties are addressing Commerce's
remand determination on the remaining CVD calculations issues.
Assuming Judge Restani is able to resolve those challenges in short
order and without further remand to Commerce, the constitutional
challenges to Public Law 112-99 are likely to be back on appeal
before the CAFC by the Summer of 2013.
Even were the CAFC to overturn the CIT and hold that the new law
is unconstitutional, that decision might apply only to the GPX case,
the Beijing Tianhai case, and the few other cases in which Commerce
applied both CVDs and ADs to the same merchandise from NMEs
between November 20. 2006, and March 13, 2012.^'^ The argument
presented in court has been limited to the unequal treatment
afforded to the companies whose investigations were initiated
between the two effective dates.^'^ A favorable ruling would benefit
only those companies.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.

Id.
Id.
Id. at*13 (quoting Romer V. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996)).
Id.
/rf. at*14.
See supra notes 162-66 and accompanying text.
SeePlaintifFs Reply, supranote 190, at 13.
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The constitutional, statutory, and regulatory issues involved in GPX
are entering their sixth year of administrative and legal dispute.
Because of the congressional intervention, none is fully resolved.
President Obama and Congressman Camp wanted to be sure the new
law would conform to WTO obligations.^'^ It almost certainly does
not,^-" and in the hasty effort to make it comply, constitutional
questions about retroactivity and ex post facto legislation were
introduced, not only for GPX, but for at least another dozen cases as
Judge Restani finally reached the CVD issues, including
privatization and pass-through, in her GPX W/decision. Those issues
are now back at Commerce on remand, but are subject to further
judicial review, by Judge Restani and ultimately the CAFC should any
part)' choose to appeal those issues. The respondent parties are in a
sixth year of burdensome and costly administrative reviews. Because
of the congressional intervention, the orders may be legal (assuming
the law that authorizes the CVD order is constitutional), but the
measurements in them remain in dispute.
The final congressional word, more punitive toward China than
analytical about differences between market and non-market
economies, has eliminated questions from the discourse without
answers. Commerce, as a matter of law, now not only can investigate
subsidies allegations in NMEs,^^^ but must impose CVDs when it finds
countervailable subsidies.^^^ Commerce, as a matter of law, must try
to avoid double counting, but were Commerce not to succeed in this
difficult task, the CVD order must remain regardless of any double
counting. Congress did not examine how subsidies can be found in
an NME; it simply ordered that they be found.^^*
A common refrain in American discourse is that courts should not
try to legislate. GPX may now stand for the proposition that Congress
should not try to adjudicate.
The CAFC was interpreting
congressional intent, and it was appropriate for Congress to express
219. Supra note 146 and accompanying text.
220. Cf WTO Appellate Body AD and CVD Ruling, supra note 110, H 541
(discussing tbe distinction between probibited and acceptable "double counting").
221. See, e.g.. Certain New Pneumatic Off-tbe-Road Tires from tbe People's
Republic of Cbina, 75 Fed. Reg. 49,459 (Dep't of Commerce Aug. 13, 2010) (notice
of amended fmal determination); Certain New Pneumatic Off-tbe-Road Tires from
tbe People's Republic of Cbina, 73 Fed. Reg. 40,480, 40,481 (Dep't of Commerce
July 15, 2008) (fmal affirmative CVD determination).
222. Application of Countervailing Duty Provisions to Nonmarket Economy
Countries, Pub. L. No. 112-99, sec. l(a), § 701 (a), 126 Stat. 265, 265 (2012).
223. Id.
224. Id.

824

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62:787

its intent. But Congress was reactive, not deliberative, and in the
process rushed legislation that created more problems, and
generated more questions, than it solved or answered.
Commerce continues to dodge the problem of developing a test
for market-oriented sectors or enterprises. Consequently, after all of
this litigation, there remains no serious attempt to address the
paradox of treating China as an NME while investigating subsidies
that must be, by definition, market-distorting.
On September 17, 2012, die PRC requested consultations
concerning whether the new law violates WTO rules, particularly
Articles IV and X of the WTO's General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT) and the Subsidies and Countervailing Measures
Agreement (SCM Agreement).^^^ The United States parried China's
subsequent request for a WTO dispute panel, but the WTO's Dispute
Setdement Body granted China's request on December 17. 2012.^^^
The Director-General composed the panel on March 4, 2013, and the
WTO must now examine the compatibility of Congress* hasty
legislation with WTO obligations.^^^
Potentially years remain in these legal proceedings, in U.S. courts
and at the WTO. The affected companies will continue to pay duties
calculated with the methodology applied to NMEs, and will continue
to be subject to annual administrative reviews. The double counting
problem, notwithstanding the new statute, likely will be resolved for
none of them. The "old" cases involved double counting that the
new statute would not correct, but the new statute will not prevent
double counting in the new cases, either. Instead, they will be
susceptible to legal contests over Commerce's likely failure to solve
the double counting problem while they pay the duties and undergo
annual administrative reviews.
Eventually, the CAFC will sort out the constitutionality of the new
statute, but the proceedings have become an expensive sideshow for
all but the companies involved in the "old" cases. Congress did settle
the most important question, authorizing CVD investigations in
NMEs,^^^ but failed to provide guidance on how this mandate is to be
carried out. The inherent contradictions in the attempt to treat
China as an NME for AD, sufficiendy a market economy for CVD, but
225. See China WTO Request for Consultations, supra note 11.
226. See Constitution of the Panel Established at the Request of China, United
States—Gounteruailing and Anti-Dumping Measures on Gertain Products from Ghina,
WT/DS449/3 (Mar. 5, 2013).
227. Id.
228. Application of Countervailing Duty Provisions to Nonmarket Economy
Countries, sec. 1, § 701 (f).
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not market enough to apply market methodologies in the AD
investigation, are neither likely to be solved by Commerce nor
condoned by the WTO.
Were GPX to prevail on appeal to the CAFC, acting virtually on
behalf of the companies against whom Commerce acted in the 20062012 window, those companies could recover substantial duties
covering many years, but more likely they will be entangled in
procedural and administrative jousting over whether, assuming they
win, the AD duties can stand and even be recalculated to account for
the elimination of the CVD duties. Hence, in winning, they may not
win much. Meanwhile, the statute mandates CVDs in the new cases,
assuming it is not found unconstitutional, or the unconstitutional
parts somehow are severed.
For the PRC, graduation from NME status will bring an end to the
debate. The WTO likely vñll not reach a conclusion before the end
of 2015 and then can rule only prospectively. Therefore, as a
practical matter, there is little for the PRC to gain at the WTO
beyond embarrassment for the United States.
The GPX cases have been grappling with the most important issues
in trade law in the new millennium, at least since the majority of
trade remedy disputes have involved Chinese merchémdise. That the
courts and agencies involved have been unable to resolve much, and
that Congressional intervention solved little, refiects the more
general paralysis in the governing institutions of the United States.
International trade, vital to economic recovery, has not benefited
from the institutions created to guarantee the rule of law. These
institutions have channeled the most important issues to the
sidelines, or resolved them with the least concentrated attention.
The law in these cases, and the lawmakers so far, have failed, and
international trade and trade law are the worse for it.
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